The Carbon County Court of Common Pleas recently reaffirmed a January 2024 verdict finding Bowmanstown Borough Authority’s actions regarding additional tapping fees for Equivalent Dwelling Units were inconsistent with its own resolution and the terms of a 1999 agreement.

Judge Steven Serfass upheld the original verdict, which stated that Kara Scott’s property should be assessed as one EDU. The ruling also ordered the authority to refund Scott the $3,000 tapping fee she had paid.

According to court paperwork, the dispute began when Bowmanstown Borough Authority charged Scott, the owner of a property now operating as a bed-and-breakfast, for an additional EDU. According to the authority, the property’s change of use justified the fee. Scott challenged this assessment, arguing that the authority had failed to adhere to its resolution and the 1999 agreement that originally allocated a single EDU to the property.

Scott filed her complaint on Jan. 20, 2022, and a non-jury trial took place on May 12, 2023. Judge Serfass delivered a verdict on Jan. 19, 2024, finding in favor of Scott. The authority subsequently filed a post-trial motion, which was argued on April 2, 2024.

In its post-trial motion, Bowmanstown Borough Authority claimed that its interpretation of Resolution 2005-02 was entitled to deference. It cited cases it felt established that courts generally refrain from interfering with administrative decisions unless there is evidence of bad faith, fraud, or capricious action.

“The Court decided to be the administrator or ultimate decision maker or interpreter of the Authority’s own resolution and interpreting that said resolution does not in fact provide authority for the additional EDU charged to Plaintiff, rather than administratively deferring and refusing to oversee or become the fact finder and providing judicial deference to the authority based on its own ordinance,” the authority argued.

Serfass rejected this argument, noting that “although courts often defer to an agency’s interpretation of the statutes it administers, when convinced that the agency’s interpretation is unwise or erroneous, that deference is unwarranted.”

The authority argued that a 1999 agreement permitted the assessment of additional EDUs if the property’s use changed. However, the court found that while the agreement “acknowledged the possibility of fees for changes in use, any such action must comply with the resolution’s unambiguous terms.”

The authority also cited a section of the resolution that it felt allows an additional EDU because Scott was connected to the municipal system prior to obtaining a bed-and-breakfast permit.

“Again, we note that the clear and unambiguous language of the resolution does not provide for the assessment of an additional EDU under the facts of this case,” Serfass wrote in his post-trial motion denial.